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Abstract 
We estimate short, medium, and long-run individual labor market effects 
of training programs for unemployed by following program participation on 
a monthly basis over a ten-year period. Since analyzing the effectiveness 
of training over such a long period is impossible with experimental data, 
we use an administrative database compiled for evaluating German train-
ing programs. Based on matching estimation adapted to the various is-
sues that arise in this particular context, we find a clear positive relation 
between the effectiveness of the programs and the unemployment rate 
over time. 
Keywords: Active labor market policy, long-run effects, matching estima-
tion, causal effects, program evaluation, panel data 
JEL classification: J 68  
IABDiscussionPaper No. 7/2007   
 
5
1 Introduction∗ 
Although the body of knowledge about the effectiveness of training pro-
grams for the unemployed is rapidly growing, there is not much convinc-
ing evidence on the relation of the effectiveness of the programs and the 
state of the economy. Such information is, however, important. If, for ex-
ample, changes in the effectiveness of the policy or its different instru-
ments are related to the business cycle, then policymakers can react by 
adjusting the policy accordingly. Thus, the policymaker should be inter-
ested in knowing under which macroeconomic circumstances the pro-
grams are more or less beneficial. It is the goal of this paper to provide 
first insights on this issue. 
The empirical literature on the effects of active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) suggests that almost all programs reduce (unsubsidized) em-
ployment and earnings in the short run. This so-called lock-in effect is well 
documented in many studies and typically attributed to reduced search 
intensity of program participants or fewer job offers by caseworkers while 
participating in the program (e.g. van Ours, 2004). If this lock-in effect, 
which can be interpreted as one component of the cost of ALMPs, varies 
with labour market conditions, this would be an important argument for 
varying the composition of programs and program size over time. 
With respect to the medium to long-run effects, some wage subsidies and 
training programs increase employability and earnings (e.g. Couch, 1992; 
Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman, 2000; Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Jacobson, 
LaLonde, and Sullivan, 2004; Jespersen, Munch, and Skipper, 2004; 
Fitzenberger and Speckesser, 2005; Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch, 2005). 
Most of this particular literature, which is more optimistic about the effec-
tiveness of ALMPs than most of the older experimental literature, is based 
                                                
∗ The first author has further affiliations with ZEW, Mannheim, CEPR, London, IZA, Bonn 
and PSI, London. Financial support from the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsfor-
schung (IAB), Nuremberg, (project 6-531a) is gratefully acknowledged. The data 
originated from a joint effort with Annette Bergemann, Bernd Fitzenberger, Ruth Mi-
quel, and Stefan Speckesser to make the administrative data accessible for research. 
The paper has been presented at workshops at the University of St. Gallen and at the 
IRP conference in Madison, 2006. We thank participants, in particular John Ham and 
Jeff Smith, for helpful comments and suggestions. The interested reader will find addi-
tional background material for this paper in an internet appendix on our website 
www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/lw_cycles. 
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on large administrative data sources with long follow-up periods. Under-
standing the differences between short-run lock-in effects and medium- to 
long-run effects that may capture more accurately the effects of the hu-
man capital added by the programs was an important step towards under-
standing how these programs work1. In fact, this difference will turn out to 
be crucial for the interpretation of our findings in this paper as well. How-
ever, none of these studies systematically investigates if and eventually 
why effects of different types of programs change over time.  
Although direct evidence based on individual data is missing on this issue, 
there is some evidence based on analyzing regional data over time. For 
example, Johansson (2001) uses variation of Swedish active labor market 
programs over municipalities. She shows that the effect of these programs 
is to prevent unemployed from leaving the labor force during a downturn. 
She concludes that ALMP programs are most effective during a downturn2.  
An alternative to macro studies that come with the usual caveats of ag-
gregation bias and policy endogeneity is to exploit the fact that different 
micro studies are conducted under different economic conditions. Meta 
studies are based on this idea. For example, Kluve (2006) combines more 
than 100 studies, and each study (or specification within a study) consti-
tutes one data point. In a regression type approach he controls for differ-
ent aspects of methods and data used, features of the program, as well as 
the economic environment. Although the analysis of the latter is not the 
main thrust of his study, he finds the program effects to be somewhat lar-
ger when unemployment rates are higher. Thus, his results seem to be 
roughly in line with Johansson (2001). Although meta studies provide in-
teresting summaries of the literature, there are problems as well. The dif-
ferent individual studies that are treated as the data of the meta analysis 
                                                
1  The recent increase in evaluation studies is documented for example by the surveys of 
Fay (1996), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Martin and Grubb (2001), Kluve 
and Schmidt (2002), and Kluve (2006). For examples of studies based on a selection 
on observables strategy, see Gerfin and Lechner (2002), van Ours (2004), or Sianesi 
(2004). A recent example of papers using instrumental variable types of assumptions 
is Frölich and Lechner (2006). The experimental literature is well documented in the 
survey by Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999). Boone and van Ours (2004) provide 
and survey empirical evidence based on aggregated time series data. 
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are based on heterogeneous programs that are run in different institu-
tional environments and economic conditions, and with different types of 
participants. It is obviously very challenging to control for all these back-
ground factors within a regression framework using only a few control 
variables and tight functional forms dictated by the limited degrees of 
freedom available. 
In this paper, we retain the advantage of the classical micro evaluation 
studies, like nonparametric identification and heterogeneity of the pro-
gram effects, but adjust the standard methodology to learn important as-
pects about the evolution of the effects over time. Since there are no ex-
periments running for a sufficiently long period to be interesting for such 
an investigation, any such endeavor has to rely on observational data. 
Survey data, however, are typically problematic because of insufficient 
sample sizes, insufficient covariate and program information, short time 
windows to observe outcomes, as well as misreporting. Newly available 
high-quality administrative data can overcome these problems. Europe, 
where experiments are rare because of strong political resistance, has 
gained competitive advantage in providing large and informative adminis-
trative data bases that allow much richer analyses than experimental data 
which are usually used in the U.S.3. 
We exploit a particularly informative administrative micro data set for 
Germany that became available only recently. These data contain reliable 
information on participants (and nonparticipants) in different types of 
training programs on a monthly basis from 1986 to 1995. Information on 
labor market outcomes is available monthly from 1980 to 2003. Thus, the 
data allow to investigate whether changes in labor market conditions in-
fluence the lock-in effects in a different way than the medium- or long-run 
effects.  
                                                                                                                                                     
2  This mechanism of the programs leading to a redirection of the flows from unemploy-
ment to out-of-labor-force towards unemployment and then towards employment ap-
pears in the cross-sectional study by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005), as well. 
3  There are only few observational studies using U.S. data and non of the data bases 
used is sufficiently informative in terms of covariates and the time horizon covered to 
study time variation of the effects of ALMP in such detail as we do (see in particular 
the survey by Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999, and Jacobson, LaLonde and Sulli-
van, 2004, for example). 
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The data have been used recently in classical evaluation studies by Fitzen-
berger and Speckesser (2005), and Lechner, Wunsch, and Miquel (2005), 
among others. These studies argue that the data are informative enough 
to control for selective participation and thus allow identification of pro-
gram effects by matching methods. Based on this identification strategy, 
we analyze the effects of training programs on short- to long-run labor 
market outcomes for unemployed entering programs over 10 years on a 
monthly basis. Another advantage of using Germany for analyzing poten-
tial time variation in the effects of training is that no major changes oc-
curred within the broad types of training programs considered in this pa-
per or in the institutional setup. 
Our empirical strategy relies on different matching estimators. We begin 
with analyzing the evolution of the effects over time. Thus, in this specifi-
cation the characteristics of participants and the use of different program 
types may vary over time. Any time pattern of the effects that we might 
isolate from this step may thus be due to changes in the composition of 
programs, of participants, and/or of economic conditions. Next, by modi-
fying the matching estimator, we keep the characteristics of the program 
participants constant over time. Thus, the remaining dynamics in the ef-
fects reflect changes in program composition and economic conditions 
only. Then, keeping the shares of the various subprograms and planned 
program durations constant as well allows us to isolate the effects of the 
economic environment. Finally, to improve our confidence in a causal in-
terpretation of the strikingly clear pattern we obtain, the results are sub-
jected to an intensive sensitivity analysis. 
In line with the recent literature mentioned above, we consistently find 
negative lock-in effects as well as positive medium to long-run employ-
ment and earnings effects of the training programs in the 10-year period 
we consider. However, we detect considerable variation of those effects 
over time which remains even for a fixed population of participants and a 
fixed composition of the programs. This variation is clearly related to the 
unemployment rate prevailing at the start of the program: The negative 
lock-in effects are smaller and the positive long-run effects are larger in 
times of higher unemployment. The effects are related to the unemploy-
ment rate at the time when the outcome is measured as well. However, 
whereas the relation to the unemployment rate at program start has di-
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rect policy implications, it is harder to see the implications of the relation 
to the unemployment rate measured much later, because the latter is un-
known at the time when decisions about program sizes are to be made. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides 
background information on the economic conditions, the unemployment 
insurance system, and the use of active labor market policies in West 
Germany in the relevant period. In Section 3, the data and the sample are 
outlined. Section 4 details the econometric identification and estimation 
strategy. In Section 5, we discuss in detail the effects of training over 
time. In the following section, we analyze how changing characteristics of 
participants or the changing composition of programs over time may have 
influenced the effectiveness of training. Section 7 describes the result of 
our extensive sensitivity analyses. The last section concludes. An appendix 
contains further details on the data, the definition of our sample and the 
outcome variables as well as on the estimation procedure. A second ap-
pendix, that is available in the internet, contains detailed background ma-
terial. 
2 Economic conditions and institutions in West 
Germany  
2.1 The West German economy between 1984 and 2003 
During the economic slowdown following the second oil-price shock, un-
employment in West Germany had risen to a quite persistent 9% in the 
mid 1980s4. Economic activity kept declining until 1988 when a slow re-
covery started. Directly after unification in 1990, West Germany experi-
enced a boom with substantial East German spending diverted away from 
domestic products to previously unavailable West German goods. Accord-
ingly, production and labor demand increased in West Germany. GDP 
grew 5.7% in 1990 and 5% in 1991. Registered unemployment declined 
to a rate of 6.3% in 1991 despite a significant growth of the labor force 
due to migration from East Germany and Eastern Europe. At the same 
time, the world economy was experiencing a recession. In 1992, this re-
                                                
4  All numbers presented in this section are taken from official statistics published by the 
Federal Employment Agency, the Institute for Employment Research and the Federal 
Statistical Office 1984-2004. 
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cession hit West Germany as well. Economic growth slowed down to only 
1.7%. One year later, the West German economy was deep in recession. 
GDP declined by 2.6% in 1993 and unemployment rose to 8%. With the 
recovery of the world economy in the late 1990s, the situation began to 
improve in West Germany as well. GDP growth increased from only 0.6% 
in 1996 to more than 3% in 2000. However, economic growth decelerated 
following the slowdown of the world economy after September 11, 2001, 
and registered unemployment returned to more than 9% in 2003. 
During the period 1984-2003, economic activity shifted especially from 
the primary and secondary sector to the service sector. The structure of 
unemployment changed as well. The fraction of unemployed without any 
professional degree declined constantly from almost 50% in 1984 to 41% 
in 2003. The share of foreigners increased over time by about 4% to 17% 
in 2003 with a temporary dip during the post-unification boom. Long-term 
unemployment has largely moved with total unemployment varying bet-
ween 26% and 38% in the period 1984-2003. 
As shown by Figure 2.1, expenditures on ALMP (training) varied by up to 
20% (30%) per year. However, they are only mildly correlated with GDP 
growth and unemployment (note the different scaling used for ALMP ex-
penditures), because political considerations (e.g. upcoming elections in 
1986, 1990, and 1998) and changes in the mix of ALMP instruments 
(1997, 2003) had strong impacts on ALMP expenditure. The fraction spent 
on labor market training almost continuously increased from 33% in 1984 
to almost 45% in 1998. It dropped slightly afterwards. In 2003, there was 
a large decline to 30% resulting from a paradigm change in the use of 
training from longer, more intense programs to short courses with less 
substantial adjustment of skills. The changes that occurred after 1995 are 
of limited interest to our empirical study, because we analyze programs 
that start between 1986 and 1995, only. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 7/2007   
 
11
Figure 2.1: Selected indicators for business cycle movements in West Germany 
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2.2 Unemployment insurance in Germany 1986 to 1995  
In Germany, unemployment insurance (UI) is compulsory for all em-
ployees with more than a minor employment including apprentices in vo-
cational training5. German UI does not cover self-employed. Persons who 
have contributed to the UI for at least 12 months within the three years 
preceding an unemployment spell are eligible for unemployment benefits 
(UB). The minimum UB entitlement is six months. The maximum claim 
increases stepwise with the total duration of the contributions in the seven 
years before becoming unemployed, and age, up to a maximum of 32 
months at age 54 or above with previous contributions of at least 64 
months. Participation in government-sponsored training counts towards 
the contribution period for both the acquisition and the duration of UB 
claims. Actual payment of UB for eligible unemployed is conditional on ac-
tive job search, regular show-up at the public employment service (PES), 
and participation in ALMP measures. Since 1994, the replacement rate is 
67% of previous average net earnings from insured employment with de-
pendent children and 60% without. Before, replacement rates were 68% 
and 63%, respectively.  
Until 2005, unemployed became eligible for unemployment assistance 
(UA) after exhaustion of UB. In contrast to UB, UA was means tested and 
                                                
5  However, civil servants (Beamte), judges, professional soldiers, clergymen and some 
other groups of persons are exempted from contributions. For further details on the 
German UI and ALMP, see the comprehensive survey by Wunsch (2005). 
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potentially indefinite. However, like UB, UA was proportional to previous 
earnings but with lower replacement rates than UB (before 1994 
58%/56%, thereafter 57%/53% with and without dependent children, re-
spectively).  
Unemployed who were ineligible for UB and UA could receive social assis-
tance, which was a fixed monthly payment unrelated to previous earnings, 
means tested and administered by local authorities. 
Note that except for the change in the UB/UA replacement rate, UI institu-
tions have been stable in the period 1986-1995. 
2.3 German ALMP 1986 to 1995  
ALMP has a long tradition in Germany and among OECD countries expen-
diture on ALMP is one of the highest (OECD, 2004). With increasing un-
employment in the 1980s, the main objective of German ALMP shifted 
from keeping employment high and fostering economic growth towards 
reducing unemployment by increasing the employability of jobseekers. 
The main instruments traditionally used in German ALMP are counseling 
and job placement services, labor market training, subsidized employ-
ment, and support of self-employment. 
Training has always been the most important type of program in West 
Germany. It consists of heterogeneous instruments that differ in the form 
and intensity of the human capital investment as well as in their respec-
tive duration. Durations range from a few weeks to three years. Tradition-
ally, German training courses have the aim of assessing, maintaining, or 
improving the occupational knowledge and skills of the participant, of ad-
justing skills to technological changes, of facilitating a career improve-
ment, or of awarding a first professional degree. So called career im-
provement measures, for which also employed may be eligible, had played 
a major role before unemployment rose in the 1980s. Since then they be-
came negligible as the focus shifted towards removal of skill deficits and 
skill mismatch of the unemployed.  
In our analysis, we distinguish five types of training. Basic job-search  
assistance (JSA) existed only until 1992. So-called practice firms (PF) 
simulate - under realistic conditions - working in a specific field of profes-
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sion. Short training (ST) with planned duration of up to six months, and 
long training (LT) with planned duration of more than six months provide 
a general update or adjustment of skills. Retraining (RT) provides a pro-
fessional degree equivalent to a degree obtained in the German appren-
ticeship system. JSA and PF have always been a relatively small program. 
ST and LT were by far the most important programs with LT gaining im-
portance relative to ST. ST more than doubled its share in the period we 
consider. RT was relatively small as well, but became more important 
from the early 1990s on. However, given its long durations it is the most 
expensive program so its share in expenditure is substantially larger than 
its share among participants. 
Access to training courses is largely limited to unemployed who are eligi-
ble for UB or UA. To underline the character of further job related training 
rather than primary occupational training, eligibility also required holding 
a first professional degree (before 1994, plus 3 years of work experience) 
or at least three years of work experience (before 1994, six years). Usu-
ally, participants receive a transfer payment, which is called maintenance 
allowance (MA). Since 1994, MA is of the same amount as UB. Before, MA 
had been somewhat higher than UB with a replacement rate of 73% with 
dependent children and 65% without. Moreover, the PES bears the direct 
cost of the program, and it may cover parts of additional expenses for 
childcare, transportation, and accommodation. 
Note that with respect to eligibility and MA, replacement rates and training 
regulations have been relatively stable. Moreover, our data allow to con-
trol for the few changes that actually occurred, especially with respect to 
the shifting emphasis on specific types of programs. 
3 Data and sample definition 
We use the same administrative data sources as Lechner, Miquel, and 
Wunsch (2005) which combine information from social insurance records 
on employment, data on benefit receipt during unemployment and infor-
mation on participation in training programs. The original data covers the 
period 1980-1997, but employment and unemployment records up to 
2003 have been added to allow construction of long-run outcome vari-
ables. The database is unique in several respects. In particular, it is much 
more informative than observational data that was available so far, e.g. 
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for the US (e.g. Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 2004). It is the first mi-
cro database that allows analyzing program participation over a suffi-
ciently long time (10 years) on a monthly basis to capture business cycle 
movements. Moreover, it allows reconstruction of up to 24 years of indi-
vidual employment histories on a monthly basis, which includes between 6 
and 15 years of pre-program history and 8 years after program start for 
observing outcome variables. Detailed personal, regional, employer and 
earnings information of good quality allow to control for all main factors 
that determine selection into programs (see the discussion in the next 
section) as well as a precise measurement of interesting outcome vari-
ables (e.g. employment status, earnings). Appendix A provides further 
details on the data.  
For our analysis, we use a sample of participants in training and eligible 
nonparticipants. We focus on the prime-age part (age 20-55) of the West 
German labor force covered by social insurance (see Appendix A for all 
details on sample selection). All unemployed who start a program in a 
particular month in the period 1986-1995 (in total 120 months) are con-
sidered participants. In contrast, we define nonparticipants on a monthly 
basis as recipients of unemployment payments (UB/UA) but not starting a 
program in that and the following 11 months. We require the latter to en-
sure that nonparticipants are not too similar to participants with respect to 
program participation while keeping potential selection bias small. To en-
sure that we do not use unemployed who completed a program shortly 
before (potential) program start (are still in an earlier unemployment-
participation-unemployment spell), we require that nobody participated in 
a program in the four years before the (potential) program start we con-
sider. To obtain a sufficient number of participants we pool participants 
and nonparticipants over a six-month window in the estimation. Thus, we 
estimate effects for 115 different program starts in the period 1986-1995. 
Since these choices may affect our estimation results, we perform an ex-
tensive sensitivity analysis with respect to these issues which is detailed in 
Section 7. 
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4 Econometrics 
We are interested in the mean effects of participating in training in period 
t ( tθ ) for some population of participants ( tP ). Varying the latter in an in-
teresting way will be one of the key issues in the following empirical sec-
tions. Based on the usual notation of the evaluation literature, we denote 
by 1tY  the potential outcome of participation in a program, and by 
0
tY  the 
potential outcome of not participating in a program. Thus, the mean of the 
effect of the policy for a member of the population of interest, tP , is given 
by ( )t tPθ  = 1( | )t tE Y P  - 0( | )t tE Y P .  
Typically, the population of interest is defined by a combination of the  
participation status ( 1tD =  indicates starting a program in month t) and a 
subset of the observed covariates ( tX ). tP  may or may not change over 
time. It includes only unemployed who are eligible for participation.  
Since participation and non-participation are not observable for the same 
individual, the issue of the identification of the effects arises. Lechner,  
Miquel and Wunsch (2005) as well as Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) 
argue that given the institutional set-up, the newly created data are in-
formative enough, such that a selection on observables strategy (the con-
ditional independence assumption, CIA) identifies the effects conditional 
on treatment status and covariates. In particular, we obtain expressions 
for the mean potential outcomes conditional on covariates that are func-
tions of participation status, observable outcomes (Yt), and covariates 
only:  
( | ', )tdt t t t tE Y D d X x= = =  ( | , )t t t t tE Y D d X x= = , { }, ' 0,1t td d ∈  . 
This equation holds for all values of tx  that are of interest.  
As argued in Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005), selection into pro-
grams is determined by three main factors: eligibility, selection by case-
workers and self-selection by potential participants. Eligibility is ensured 
by the construction of our sample (see Appendix A.2 for details). Case-
workers select participants based on individual employment prospects and 
corresponding skill deficits, chances for successful completion of a pro-
gram and conditions on the local labor market. For the unemployed a 
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strong incentive to participate is the potential renewal or extension of un-
employment benefit claims. 
Our data allow to reconstruct between 6 and 15 years of individual pre-
program employment histories on a monthly basis, and it contains de-
tailed personal, regional, employer and earnings information of good qual-
ity (consult the internet appendix for a complete list of variables). More-
over, we are able to construct initial and remaining benefit claims from 
the data. Thus, it allows controlling for all main factors that determine se-
lection into programs (see also the internet appendix for a detailed discus-
sion of the validity of the CIA in our data). 
In fact, since in most cases considered below we interpret the changes of 
the effects over time, any violation of the conditional independence as-
sumption that leads to a bias that does not change over time would not 
hurt our main conclusions in this paper. 
Given identification of the quantities mentioned above, under the usual 
assumptions a matching strategy identifies our parameters of interest, be-
cause 
( )t tPθ  = |( | 1, ) ( )t tt t t X PE Y D X x f x dx= =∫  - |( | 0, ) ( )t tt t t X PE Y D X x f x dx= =∫ .  
| ( )t tX Pf x  denotes the distribution of tX  in the population Pt. In the next sec-
tion, we call | ( )t tX Pf x  the target population towards which the distributions 
of tX  for participants and nonparticipants are adjusted. An example of 
such a target population would be the participants in period t. In this case, 
we would estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). 
Alternatively, another popular choice would be the population of partici-
pants and nonparticipants in t, leading to tθ  being the average treatment 
effect (ATE).  
Having established identification of the effects, the question of the appro-
priate estimator arises. All possible parametric, semi- and nonparametric 
estimators are (implicitly or explicitly) built on the principle that for every 
comparison of two programs and for every participant in one of those pro-
grams we need a comparison observation from the other program with the 
same characteristics regarding all factors that jointly influence selection 
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and outcomes. Here, we use propensity score matching estimators to pro-
duce such comparisons. An advantage of these estimators is that they are 
essentially nonparametric and that they allow arbitrary individual effect 
heterogeneity (see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; Imbens, 2004, 
provides an excellent survey of the recent advances in this field). All de-
tails of the estimator are relegated to Appendix B. 
5 The program effects over time 
According to German legislation, the most important objectives of active 
labor market policy are to increase reemployment chances and to reduce 
the probability to remain unemployed. Therefore, we use outcome vari-
ables related to the employment status, in particular registered unem-
ployment and employment subject to social insurance6. We also consider 
gross earnings as a crude measure for individual productivity. 
All effects are measured from the month of the (potential) program start 
on. Focusing on the beginning instead of the end of the programs rules 
out that programs appear to be successful, just because they keep their 
participants busy by making them stay in the program. We consider a pro-
gram most successful if everybody would leave for employment immedi-
ately after starting participation. Whenever a person participates in a pro-
gram, he is considered as registered unemployed (and not employed). We 
also consider a total effect, i.e. the cumulated effects of the program from 
its beginning to the respective point of measurement. Appendix A.3 con-
tains further details on how the outcome variables are constructed.  
Since the effects measured for the different outcome variables appear to 
be in line with each other, the main body of the text presents results for 
the outcome variables registered unemployment and employment only. 
Detailed information for all other outcomes is relegated to the internet ap-
pendix. We measure these outcomes at different distances to program 
start for a better understanding of the dynamic evolution of the effects 
over time. Usually, we expect the program to begin with a negative lock-
in effect before the effect reaches its long-run level. The lock-in effect is 
                                                
6  Here 'registered unemployment' is defined as receipt of UB or UA or participation in 
training. 
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approximated by the effect after 6 months. The long-run effect is approxi-
mated by the effect after 8 years. However, the effects appear not to 
change too much after about 3 years. 
Figure 5.1 shows the short-run and long-run effects of training for each 
starting month in the period January 1986 to July 1995. We find that after 
6 months, programs increase the unemployment probability by about 
25%-points for participants, and, correspondingly, reduce the employ-
ment probability by about 15% points. In the long run, employment is in-
creased by about 10% points, but any effect on unemployment is hard to 
spot (if there is any, then unemployment is increased). Thus, the program 
effect operates by increasing employment at the expense of the share of 
unemployed leaving the labor force7. Considering the effects on earnings 
(nonemployment is counted as zero), we find similar effects with an aver-
age long-run monthly earnings gain of about 100 EUR. Although all effects 
show considerable variation over time, it is hard to spot any relation with 
the unemployment rate, which is shown in Figure 5.1 as well (for a better 
exposition, it is presented net of its mean over the 115 months presented 
in the table). 
                                                
7  These findings are largely consistent with the studies analysing the effects of post 
1992 training programs with these data (i.e. Fitzenberger and Speckesser, 2005; 
Fitzenberger, Osikominu and Völter, 2006, and Lechner, Miquel, Wunsch, 2005; but 
note the different definitions of participation and nonparticipation in these studies). 
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Figure 5.1: Effect of training on the employment and unemployment probabili-
ties of participants  
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U6TH significant U96TH significant E6TH significant E96TH significant U6TH
U96TH E9TH E96TH Unemployment rate  
Note:  The outcome variables are named as follows: U: unemployment, E: employment, 6 or 96: 
month after program start, TH: theta (average treatment effect on the treated). For each out-
come variable, dots appear if the effect is significant at the 5% level in a particular month. 
The unemployment rate is presented net of its mean 1986-1995. All effects are smoothed 
using three-month moving averages. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the estimates for the mean of the potential outcome 
variable employment that underlies the corresponding effect estimates in 
Figure 5.1. The short-run outcomes show a clear seasonal effect (at least 
for the first 8 years), whereas, not surprisingly, such relation does not ap-
pear for the long-run effects. 
Finally, Figure 5.3 shows the cumulated effects in months of (un)employ-
ment over time. They imply that the total negative effect in the first 6 
months after program start corresponds to a reduction of about 1.5 
months of employment as well as an additional month of unemployment. 
In the long run, there appears to be a gain of about 4-6 months of em-
ployment and an additional 4-6 months of unemployment (!), which again 
suggests that the programs reduce the share of people leaving the labor 
force drastically. Comparing the cumulated effects with a particular point-
in-time estimate after treatment, we find very similar shapes of the effects 
over time, although obviously the magnitudes and sampling uncertainty 
differs. 
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Figure 5.2: Mean employment rates of participation and nonparticipation for 
participants 
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Note:  The outcome variables are named as follows: E: employment, 6 or 96: month after program 
start, 0: nonparticipation, 1: participation, M: mean level. The unemployment rate is pre-
sented net of its mean 1986-1995. All effects are smoothed using three-month moving aver-
ages. 
 
The next step is to condense the dynamic information about the effects 
and check their correlation with indicators for the economic development 
more thoroughly. In Table 5.1, we show the correlation of the effects pre-
sented, including earnings, as well as the effects measured after 3 and 
respectively 6 years after program start, with the quarterly GDP growth 
rate, the monthly unemployment rate, and the monthly number of partici-
pants in training programs. The internet appendix presents correlations of 
the unemployment rate with the estimated means of the potential out-
comes as well8. 
                                                
8  The significance levels of the correlations are obtained from a bivariate regression of 
the effects on a constant and the respective macroeconomic indicator using the 
Newey-West procedure to correct for the correlation of the program effects over time. 
The significance level presented corresponds to the two-sided t-test that the coeffi-
cient on the unemployment rate is zero. 
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Figure 5.3: Cumulated effects of training on the employment and unemploy-
ment probabilities of participants (in months) 
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Note:  The outcome variables are named as follows: CU: cumulated unemployment, CE: cumulated 
employment, 6 or 96: month after program start, TH: theta (average treatment effect on the 
treated). For each outcome variable, dots appear if the effect is significant at the 5% level in 
a particular month. The unemployment rate is presented net of its mean 1986-1995. All ef-
fects are smoothed using three-month moving averages. 
 
The results suggest that the programs are more effective when unem-
ployment is higher at the time when the program starts. This positive de-
pendence of the program effect on the unemployment rate is somewhat 
larger for the long-run effects than for the lock-in effects. If these correla-
tions have a causal interpretation, their magnitudes imply for example 
that on average the employment effect of the programs increases by 
about 0.7-1.8% points when the national unemployment rate is increased 
by 1%-point (depending on the point in time after program start when the 
outcome is measured). When we change the perspective and correlate the 
effects with the unemployment rate in the month when the outcome is  
actually measured, then not surprisingly the correlations change because 
unemployment is measured at a later point in the economic cycle. There-
fore, the magnitude of the change depends on the distance. Typically, the 
correlations for the lock-in effects get somewhat smaller, whereas those of 
the long-term effects change sign. However, the correlation with the un-
employment rate at the time of outcome measurement has only limited 
appeal in a policy sense, because that information is unknown at the time 
of the participation decision and therefore hard to use to improve the 
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training policy9.  Finally, the quarterly GDP figures appear to be too rough 
to detect any correlation. Similarly, no systematic correlation can be de-
tected with indicators of program size, like the number of participants. 
Table 5.1: Correlation of the program effects with indicators for the macro-
economic situation in % 
Unemployment rate at 
Outcome 
program 
start 
 
outcome 
measure-
ment 
Quarterly 
GDP growth 
rate 
 
# of partici-
pants in 
training pro-
grams 
Unemployment  6 months after prog. start -43** -33* 3 19 
  3 years after prog. start -36* 21 8 10 
  6 years after prog. start -27* 24* 15 21 
  8 years after prog. start -1 26 17 17 
Employment 6 months after prog. start 25* 5 8 -1 
  3 years after prog. start 45** -45** 2 -3 
  6 years after prog. start 43** -33** -3 -33** 
  8 years after prog. start 31** -47** -12 -50** 
Monthly earnings 6 months after prog. st. 20 1 7 7 
  3 years after prog. start 48** -58** 5 -2 
  6 years after prog. start 53** -43** 7 -29* 
  8 years after prog. start 47** -50** 1 -40** 
Cumulated unemployment 6 months after -43** -43** 8 15 
  3 years after prog. start -65** -27** 20* 24 
  6 years after prog. start -57** 19 16 20 
  8 years after prog. start -50** 27 17 22 
Cumulated employment 6 months after 20 20 6 9 
  3 years after prog. start 47** -14 -6 2 
  6 years after prog. start 50** -43** -2 -10 
  8 years after prog. start 52** -37** -4 -22 
Cumulated earnings 6 months after p.s. 13 13 8 17* 
  3 years after prog. start 46** -18 -2 5 
  6 years after prog. start 51** -51** 4 -5 
  8 years after prog. start 56** -48** 4 -15 
Note:  The unemployment rate at outcome measurement is the rate measured in the respective 
month after program start. For the cumulated outcomes, the unemployment rate at outcome 
measurement is the average unemployment rate over the respective period.  
Newey-West autocorrelation-robust t-values: ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 
5% level. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we will try to gain more insights on why 
there is such a positive correlation between the effectiveness of the pro-
                                                
9  When both unemployment rates are simultaneously included in the regression, for the 
long-run effects both coefficients are typically significant. The coefficients have about 
the same sign and magnitude as in the bivariate regressions. This feature remains for 
the specifications to be discussed in the next sections. For the lock-in effects, the two 
rates are almost collinear. 
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grams and labor market conditions as characterized by the monthly un-
employment rate. 
6 The changing composition of program partici-
pants and programs 
6.1 Participants 
The key question raised by the previously found relation between the ef-
fects and the state of the labor market is whether these correlations re-
flect the fact that the same programs have different effects (different pro-
duction functions) depending on the state of the economy or whether the 
correlations are spurious. A spurious correlation could be induced by some 
other background factor moving the effects in a similar direction as the 
unemployment rate. Therefore, it is important to 'eliminate' other poten-
tially important factors that change over time, and affect program effec-
tiveness.  
The first such potential factor relates to the dependence of the pool of po-
tential participants from which the actual participants are selected on the 
state of the economy. In a recession, there might be excess supply of un-
employed who would benefit from the programs. When the economy re-
covers fewer of them would be available, but program places still have to 
be filled (for example because there is a rigidity in the adjustment of the 
supply of courses due to long-run contracts between the PES and suppli-
ers). Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the changes of the composition of partici-
pants and nonparticipants over time for some selected characteristics. We 
see that both groups change, and that they change in a similar fashion. In 
more detail, the share of women, the employment histories and the edu-
cation levels fluctuate, whereas the share of foreigners increases more or 
less continuously. 
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Figure 6.1: Composition of participants over time – means of selected variables 
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Note:  Mean of the respective variable in the population of participants. Six month moving averages 
(to align figures with the pooling of participants in the estimation). 
 
Figure 6.2: Composition of nonparticipants over time – means of selected  
variables 
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Woman Foreigner No prof. degree
Uni/college degree Duration of last unemployment Fraction employed in last 6 years
Fraction unemployed in last 6 years  
Note:  Mean of the respective variable in the population of nonparticipants. Six-month moving aver-
ages (to align figures with the pooling of nonparticipants in the estimation). 
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The impression that the change in the characteristics of participants over 
time merely reflects changes in the supply of unemployed is confirmed as 
well by looking at the monthly probit models for program participation 
that do not show any large difference in the conditional selection model 
over time (for detailed probit estimates see the internet appendix). 
A key question that remains is whether these changes in the composition 
of program participants are correlated with the situation in the labor mar-
ket as well. Table 6.1 shows that this is indeed the case. 
Table 6.1: Correlation of the characteristics of participants with unemployment 
rate in % 
Characteristics of program participants 
       Unemployment rate 
         at program start 
Woman                  -52** 
Foreigner                  -24* 
No professional degree                  -67** 
University/college degree                    7 
Duration of last unemployment spell                 -51** 
Fraction of months employed in the last 6 years                  82** 
Fraction of months unemployed in the last 6 years                 -46** 
Note:  Correlation of monthly mean of respective variable (six-month moving average) with the 
unemployment rate. 
Newey-West autocorrelation-robust t-values: ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 
5% level. 
 
Keeping in mind that current unemployment rates are likely to be nega-
tively correlated with average unemployment rates in the last six years, 
the negative correlation between unemployment in the past and the posi-
tive correlation with past employment is expected. However, participation 
of women, foreigners, and unemployed with lower education is also lower 
during times of higher unemployment.  
To the extend that there is effect heterogeneity, a fact that is documented 
in numerous evaluation studies (for West Germany, e.g. Lechner, Miquel, 
and Wunsch, 2005), such systematic relationships between the state of 
the labor market and the characteristics of participants might influence 
the correlation with the effects as well. Therefore, Figure 6.3 shows the 
effects of the training programs for a fixed population of participants. This 
population is defined as having the average characteristics of the overall 
population of participants in the period 1986-1995, reduced to the inter-
section of all common supports over time. That is, more technically speak-
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ing, we define a target population of participants with comparable partici-
pants and nonparticipants in all months10. Month by month, we match 
participants as well as nonparticipants with respect to that target distribu-
tion. Since the target distribution is the same for all periods, characteris-
tics of the participants are held constant in the estimation of the effects of 
training11. 
Figure 6.3: Effect of training on the employment and unemployment probabili-
ties of participants (stable characteristics of participants) 
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U96TH E9TH E96TH Unemployment rate  
Note:  The outcome variables are named as follows: U: unemployment, E: employment, 6 or 96: 
month after program start, TH: theta (average treatment effect on the treated). For each out-
come variable, dots appear if the effect is significant at the 5% level in a particular month. 
The unemployment rate is presented net of its mean 1986-1995. All effects are smoothed 
using three-month moving averages. 
 
Albeit somewhat larger, the results appear to be similar to those for the 
specification that allows the characteristics of the participants to vary over 
time. Particularly when we take into account that due to reduced sample 
size coming from the far more restrictive common support requirement, 
sampling uncertainty is somewhat larger. Checking the correlation of the 
                                                
10 Out of 9418 participants in the reference population, only 2101 (22%) fulfil this crite-
rion. 
11 By defining the characteristics used in matching, we carefully avoid that they depend 
on time or a function of it (e.g. we capture different regional labor market states not 
by different unemployment rates but by the regional deviation from the national mean 
at that time). 
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effects that result from this specification with different indicators of the 
macroeconomic situation, it turns out that, if anything changes, then the 
correlations increase. Table 6.2 shows the exact values of those correla-
tions for the unemployment rates and selected outcome variables. 
Table 6.2: Correlation of the program effects with the unemployment rate in %  
(stable characteristics of participants) 
Unemployment rate at 
Previous specification: 
Unemployment rate at 
Outcome 
program 
start 
 
outcome 
measure-
ment 
program 
start 
 
outcome 
measure-
ment 
Unemployment  6 months after prog. start -49** -45** -43** -33* 
  3 years after prog. start -48** 19 -36* 21 
  8 years after prog. start 19 15 -1 26 
Employment 6 months after prog. start 36** 24 25* 5 
  3 years after prog. start 45** -56** 45** -45** 
  8 years after prog. start 31* -30** 31** -47** 
Monthly earnings 6 months after pr. start 40** 26 20 1 
  3 years after prog. start 44** -66** 48** -58** 
  8 years after prog. start 53** -27* 47** -50** 
Note:  The unemployment rate at outcome measurement is the rate measured in the respective 
month after program start.  
Newey-West autocorrelation-robust t-values: ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 
5% level. 
  
6.2 Programs 
Figure 6.4 shows that other import factors that change over time are the 
composition of the training policy and average planned durations of the 
training courses12.  
Long training increases over time, whereas the job search assistance pro-
grams were terminated after 1992. The shares of the other program 
groups fluctuate in an unsystematic matter. Similarly, the planned pro-
gram duration of all participants fluctuates considerably. It reaches its 
peak of more than 12 months for programs beginning in the second part 
of 1993, where the rather long retraining courses have been used quite 
                                                
12 This figure is based on the participants used in Section 5. The plot for the target popu-
lation defined in Section 6.1 is very similar and therefore relegated to the internet ap-
pendix. That appendix shows also a plot of the program type specific planned dura-
tions. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 7/2007   
 
28
extensively. The lowest level of about 6 months appears in 1986, where 
short training was most important. 
Figure 6.4: Shares of different programs and average planned duration  
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Note:  Units of measurement: Shares for the different programs; months /10 for program duration. 
 
 
Table 6.3: Correlation of the characteristics of the training policy with the  
unemployment rate in % 
Unemployment rate at program start 
Characteristics of programs Participants Stable participants 
Fraction of participants in practice firms 5 -4 
Fraction of participants in short training 28** 26** 
Fraction of participants in long training 34** 25** 
Fraction of participants in retraining -1 6 
Fraction of participants in job search assistance -42** -27* 
Planned program duration 6 1 
Planned duration of practice firms -34** 20 
Planned duration of short training -20* 27** 
Planned duration of long training -13 6 
Planned duration of retraining -21* -54** 
Planned duration of job search assistance 34** 46** 
Note:  Correlation of monthly mean of respective variable (six-month moving average) with the 
unemployment rate. Participants are those participants used in Section 5, whereas stable 
participants are those used in Section 6.1.  
Newey-West autocorrelation-robust t-values: ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 
5% level. 
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As before, the key question is whether these changes are related to labor 
market conditions as well. Table 6.3 shows the correlation of those vari-
ables with the unemployment rate. These results suggest that this correla-
tion exists, at least for short and long training (positive) and job search 
assistance (negative). This finding holds for all participants as well as 
those used in the previous section. 
To take out the effects of changing program shares and planned durations 
over time, we keep the characteristics of participants (as in the previous 
section) as well as the program shares and planned program durations 
constant over time by following exactly the same approach as described in 
Section 6.1. We also add the type of program as well as its planned dura-
tion as additional matching variables for program participants (obviously, 
nothing changes for nonparticipants). Figure 6.5 shows the results. They 
are based on a population of participants with an average duration of pro-
grams of 9.4 months (standard deviation is 7.5 months). 46% of those 
participants take part in short training, 34% in long training, and 20% in 
retraining. Participants receiving job search assistance are omitted be-
cause the program is terminated after 1992. Since participants in job 
search assistance are no longer part of the reference population to which 
participants and non-participants are matched, they are removed from the 
sample and estimates of the effects for this program do not appear in this 
figure.  
Although the effects seem to be somewhat larger than in the previous 
specifications, these changes are most likely within a range that could be 
attributed to sampling error. Analyzing the correlations of the effects with 
the unemployment rate (Table 6.4), we find that, at least for employment, 
the correlations increase further compared to the previous two specifica-
tions. 
Overall, we conclude that keeping the characteristics of the participants 
and the training policy constant, reaffirms the findings of the previous sec-
tion that programs are more effective when unemployment is high. 
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Figure 6.5: Effect of training on the employment and unemployment probabili-
ties of participants (stable characteristics of participants, program 
types, and programme durations) 
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
186 686 1186 487 987 288 788 1288 589 1089 390 890 191 691 1191 492 992 293 793 1293 594 1094 395
U6TH significant U96TH significant E6TH significant E96TH significant U6TH
U96TH E9TH E96TH Unemployment rate  
Note:  The effects are named as follows: U: unemployment, E: employment, 6 or 96: month after 
program start, TH: theta (average treatment effect on the treated). For each outcome vari-
able, dots appear if the effect is significant at the 5% level in a particular month. The unem-
ployment rate is presented net of its mean 1986-1995. All effects are smoothed using three-
month moving averages. 
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Table 6.4: Correlation of the program effects with the unemployment rate % 
(stable characteristics of participants, program types, and pro-
gramme durations) 
Unemployment rate at 
Previous specification: 
Unemployment rates at 
program start 
Outcome 
program 
start 
 
outcome 
measure-
ment 
participants 
constant 
participants 
change 
Unemployment  6 months after prog. start -58** -58** -49** -43** 
  3 years after prog. start -39** 28* -48** -36* 
  8 years after prog. start 3 2 19 -1 
Employment 6 months after prog. start 46** 37* 36** 25* 
  3 years after prog. start 31* -56** 45** 45** 
  8 years after prog. start 40** -22 31* 31** 
Monthly earnings 6 months after pr. start 52** 42** 40** 20 
  3 years after prog. start 37* -63** 44** 48** 
  8 years after prog. start 55** -13 53** 47** 
Note:  The unemployment rate at outcome measurement is the rate measured in the respective 
month after program start. 
Newey-West autocorrelation-robust t-values: ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 
5% level. 
 
7 Sensitivity analysis 
7.1 Seasonal patterns 
Visual inspection of the effect estimates in the various specifications pre-
sented before may suggest that the correlation with the unemployment 
rate is merely a reflection of some seasonal variation, instead of a more 
long-term macroeconomic trend. To understand whether this may be a 
valid interpretation, we analyze the seasonal pattern of the effects di-
rectly.  
To do so, we aggregate monthly participation along the starting month of 
the programs over the years and consider the effects conditional on that 
particular starting month leading to twelve subsamples for which we esti-
mate the effects (January to December). Since visual inspection suggests 
a different seasonal pattern for the first and the second half of the sample, 
those two periods are considered separately. As for the estimation of the 
development over time, three different specifications are estimated. Fig-
ure 7.1 presents the results for the specification with constant population 
and program shares. Since the results for the other two specifications are 
similar, their results are relegated to the internet appendix. 
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Figure 7.1: Seasonal effects of training on the employment and unemployment 
probabilities of participants (stable characteristics of partici-
pants, program types, and durations) 
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Note:  The effects are named as follows: U: unemployment, E: employment, 6 or 96: month after 
program start, TH: theta (average treatment effect on the treated). For each outcome vari-
able, dots appear if the effect is significant at the 5% level in a particular month. The unem-
ployment rate is presented net of its mean in each time window. Unemployment rate is ag-
gregated for particular month over the respective time window.  
 
It is hard to detect any systematic pattern in Figures 7.1, which is proba-
bly related to the fact that the variation in the unemployment rate over 
the year is rather small. This view is confirmed by considering the correla-
tions between the effects and the unemployment rate given in Table 7.1. 
In that table, which is based on 12 months and thus only 12 data points, 
all correlations are insignificant. Furthermore, it is very hard to detect any 
systematic pattern in these correlations. 
Table 7.1: Correlation of the program effects with the unemployment rate in % 
(participants and program compositions do not change over time) 
Average monthly unemployment rate program start 
Outcome 1986-1990 1991-1995 
Unemployment  6 months after prog. start 45 39 
  3 years after prog. start 11 -11 
  8 years after prog. start -46 -29 
Employment 6 months after prog. start -45 -32 
  3 years after prog. start -26 -2 
  8 years after prog. start 6 -5 
Monthly earnings 6 months after pr. start -61 -25 
  3 years after prog. start -18 -8 
  8 years after prog. start -5 -12 
Note: 12 observations for each cell. All correlations are insignificant at the 5% level. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that seasonal correlation cannot be an important 
part of the explanation for the correlation between the effects and labor 
market conditions.  
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An additional check of our results is to use the six-month rolling window 
and base the seasonal analysis on the first month of that window, as this 
corresponds most closely to the procedure used in Section 6. Again, the 
results do not suggest that the above found correlation of the effects with 
monthly unemployment rates may be related to seasonal effects (for de-
tailed results see the internet appendix). 
7.2 Regional variation 
If it is true that the effectiveness of the training programs increases with 
unemployment, then one should expect that programs are more effective 
in regions with higher unemployment than in regions with lower unem-
ployment. Therefore, the analysis is done separately for high and low un-
employment regions. Of course, just comparing effects in regions with low 
and high unemployment is not satisfactory, because many aspects of the 
labor market that might influence program effects, like the industry struc-
ture and the characteristics of the participants differ across local labor 
market. To minimize these problems, we use a similar matching strategy 
as before. We specify the same target distribution of characteristics of 
participants in both subsamples and then perform matching as before. 
Since splitting the sample increases the noise in our estimates considerab-
ly, we choose an overlapping split (60% of all unemployed facing the low-
est regional unemployment rates vs. 60% of those unemployed facing the 
highest ones)13. Figure 7.2 shows the corresponding results. 
7.3 Stability of the correlation between the effects and 
unemployment over time 
There may be the concern that the relation between unemployment and 
program effects holds only for the early participants and is no longer rele-
vant for more recent programs. Therefore, we repeat our correlation 
analysis for the first and second half of the ten year period to see whether 
the correlations between the effects of the programs and the labor market 
conditions remain constant before and after German unification. 
                                                
13 We used a classification in terms of deviation of the local unemployment rate from its 
10-year mean to rule out conditioning on the business cycle. 
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The findings shown in Table 7.3 confirm again that short and long-term 
employment and earnings outcomes are positively related to the unem-
ployment rate. However, one of the measures for medium-run outcomes 
(3 years after program start) is large and significant in the first period, 
whereas the correlation for the other long-run outcome (8 years after pro-
gram start) is large and significant in the second period. We conjecture 
that this appears most likely because of the additional sampling uncer-
tainty coming from reducing the sample by half. 
Table 7.3: Correlation of the program effects with indicators for the macroeco-
nomic situation in % for the first and second half of the sample (sta-
ble characteristics of participants, program types, and durations) 
Monthly unemployment rate at 
program start outcome measurement 
Outcome 1986-1990 1991-1995 1986-1990 1991-1995 
Unemployment  6 months after training -38* -75** -44** -65** 
  3 years after training -70** -20 53** -24 
  8 years after training 2 6 20 33 
Employment 6 months after training 33* 55** 38* 40* 
  3 years after training 62** 4 -48** 5 
  8 years after training 23 56** 10 -29 
Monthly earnings 6 months after training 41** 62** 43** 48* 
  3 years after training 55** 19 -63** 20 
  8 years after training 29 68** 8 -38* 
Note:  The last month in the first period is September 1990. The first month in the second period is 
October 1990. The unemployment rate at outcome measurement is the rate measured in the 
respective month after program start.  
Newey-West autocorrelation-robust t-values: ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 
5% level. 
 
7.4 Further sensitivity checks 
This section summarizes further checks to improve the credibility of our 
key result that the effects of the training programs are positively corre-
lated with the unemployment rate over time. For the sake of brevity, all 
the details are relegated to the internet appendix. 
Before discussing the different checks, the reader should be aware of the 
limitations of the data. Given that we are interested in the dynamic evolu-
tion of the effects in relation to the starting dates of the program, the 
sample sizes for participants quickly become too small to powerfully check 
for individual heterogeneity. For example, it would be interesting to inves-
tigate the correlations of the effects of the different types of programs 
with the labor market conditions. Clearly, there are not enough observa-
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tions for practice firms, retraining and job search assistance, but even the 
estimates for the larger groups of short and long training courses are too 
noisy to allow any firm conclusions. In a similar vein, it is not possible to 
investigate the issues of participant subgroup heterogeneity much further. 
A crucial issue that comes up in our implementation is how observations 
are aggregated over time. For each month, the results above are based on 
the participants and nonparticipants of one and the next five months. For 
a sensitivity check that window is, first, reduced to four months and, se-
cond, increased to nine months. The results are detailed in the internet 
appendix. Qualitatively, the results do not change, but, again, in the first 
case sample size becomes an issue. Thus, in the first case the precision of 
the estimated coefficients is reduced whereas in the second case precision 
increases. With respect to the correlation of the effects with the unem-
ployment rate over time, we find somewhat smaller (larger) correlations 
when the pooling window is reduced (increased) but the overall conclu-
sions do not change.  
Furthermore, there might be an issue on how a nonparticipant is defined 
(see the papers by Frederickson and Johansson, 2003, 2004, and Sianesi, 
2004). In all results presented above, nonparticipants are required not to 
participate for the 12 months following and including their potential pro-
gram start. We checked the sensitivity of our results by requiring 6 (24) 
months instead which reduces (increases) potential selection bias but 
makes nonparticipants in a particular month more (less) similar to partici-
pants. In both cases, we find very similar results to the ones presented 
above.  
Another issue is that future participation rates of nonparticipants might be 
related to the business cycle. We find that future participation rates for 
both participants and nonparticipants are decreasing over the ten-year 
period we consider and that they are uncorrelated with the unemployment 
rate (see the internet appendix for all details). Thus, the correlation of the 
program effects with the unemployment rate we find is not due to differ-
ential future program participation of nonparticipants over the business 
cycle. 
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Finally, the fact that we require all persons not to have participated in a 
program in the 48 months before (potential) program start might affect 
our results. For the most important specification with stable population 
and program characteristics, this choice does not matter at all since the 
common support of the reference population we choose only includes per-
sons who have never participated in a program before. 
The estimation and inference of the correlations may be questioned. Using 
regression-based inference based on the Newey-West t-values as imple-
mented in EVIEWS should take care of any autocorrelation and heterosce-
dasticity that is inherent in the effects (e.g. by construction of the moving 
6-months defining participation). In addition, the dependent variable in 
that regression is estimated and thus mismeasured. Since it is consis-
tently estimated, this type of measurement error in the dependent vari-
able should not matter. Nevertheless, as a sensitivity check we estimated 
a weighted regression in which the weights are proportional to the preci-
sion of the effects. Again, the results confirmed our findings. 
It remains to check the sensitivity of the results with respect to some  
operational characteristics of the chosen matching estimator, like the bias 
correction procedure or the choice of the caliper width. Such checks have 
been extensively performed and documented by Lechner, Miquel, and 
Wunsch (2005) who use an identical estimator, but apply it only at one 
point in time. The reader is referred to their results which indicate a low 
sensitivity of the estimator with respect to not too large changes of these 
parameters.  
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8 Conclusions 
We analyze the effects of training programs for the unemployed over a 
ten-year period based on newly available very informative German ad-
ministrative data. We generally find negative lock-in effects as well as 
positive medium to long-run employment and earnings effects of the 
training programs. We also detect considerable variation of the effects 
over time. This variation remains even when we artificially (econometri-
cally) keep the characteristics of participants and the composition of the 
programs (which show considerable variation) constant over time. We find 
that this variation is related to unemployment at the start of the program, 
in the sense that the negative lock-in effects are larger in times of low un-
employment and the positive long-run effects are larger in times of high 
unemployment. 
At least for the first part of this finding the explanation appears to be ob-
vious. The negative lock-in effects occur because, while in the program, 
the unemployed show reduced job search effort and receive less job offers 
from the caseworker. Therefore, unemployed not 'locked-in' a program 
find jobs faster. However, if unemployment is high, it takes longer to find 
a job. Hence, the cost of reduced job search because of attending a pro-
gram is lower. Since this affects the current participants in the program, 
we expect the lock-in effect to worsen when the labor market situation 
improves. For the long-run effects, it is not so obvious why this correlation 
between effects and labor market conditions exists. One immediate expla-
nation is, however, that the negative lock-in effects continue to influence 
labor market outcomes, although they are dominated by the positive ef-
fects of the additional human capital received in the programs. Thus, even 
if the human capital effect is more or less unrelated to labor market condi-
tions, the respective correlation of the lock-in effect is sufficient to induce 
the same correlation in the medium and long-run effects as found for the 
lock-in effects. 
In conclusion, our results suggest that when the economy picks up and 
unemployment falls, one may want to reduce the volume of training pro-
grams by more than the proportional reduction in unemployment would 
suggest. One the other hand, when labor market conditions worsen, then 
the share of unemployed in the programs might be increased. 
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Appendix A: Data  
A.1 Further details on the data 
Table A.1 briefly describes the three different administrative data sources 
used to compile the data that are the basis of this study. 
Table A.1: Combined administrative data sources used  
 IAB Employment subsample 
(ES) 
Benefit payment register 
(BPR) 
Training participant data 
(TPD) 
Source Employer supplied mandatory 
social insurance entries 1980-
2003. 
Benefit payment register 
of the PES 1980-2003. 
Questionnaires filled in by 
PES staff for statistical 
purposes. 
Popula-
tion 
1% random sample of per-
sons covered by social insur-
ance for at least one day 
1975-1997. Self-employed, 
civil servants, university stu-
dents are not included.  
Recipients of benefit pay-
ments from the PES. 
Participants in further 
training, retraining, short 
training, German lan-
guage courses and tem-
porary wage subsidies 
1980-1997. 
Available 
informa-
tion 
Personal characteristics and 
history of employment.  
Personal characteristics 
and information on the 
receipt of benefit pay-
ments from the PES. 
Personal characteristics 
of participants and infor-
mation about training 
programs. 
Impor-
tant 
variables 
Gender, age, nationality, edu-
cation, profession, occupa-
tional status, industry, firm 
size, earnings, regional infor-
mation. 
Family status, number of 
children, type, and 
amount of benefits re-
ceived. 
Type, duration, and result 
of the programme, type of 
income support paid dur-
ing participation. 
Note:  The merged data is based on monthly information. For detailed information on the merging 
and recoding procedures, see Bender et al. (2005). The construction of this database is a 
result of a three-year joint project of research groups at the Universities of Mannheim (Ber-
gemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser) and St. Gallen (Lechner, Miquel, Wunsch) as well as 
the Institute for Employment Research of the FEA (Bender). A detailed description of the ES 
is provided by Bender et al. (1996) and Bender, Haas and Klose (2000). For the TPD see 
Miquel, Wunsch, and Lechner (2002).  
 
The administrative data we use are the most comprehensive database 
with respect to training in Germany prior to 1998. Unfortunately, collec-
tion of training participation data is discontinued in 1998. It covers an ex-
ceptionally long time horizon for observing not only individual employment 
histories before and after program participation but also for participation 
itself. Furthermore, the data are very rich in covariates that can be used 
to control for selectivity. 
A.2 Evaluation sample and definition of participation 
status 
Our evaluation sample consists of the prime-age part (age 20-55) of the 
West German population observed at least once in employment subject to 
social insurance before a (potential) program start. We exclude persons 
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who were last employed as home workers, apprentices, trainees, or part-
time workers below half of the full-time equivalent, because we want to 
focus on the most common forms of regular employment.  
Participants are all unemployed who start a program in a particular month 
between 1986 and 1995 (120 months). Nonparticipants are all unem-
ployed who do not start a program but receive UB/UA in that month. As 
long as they fulfil all sample selection criteria individuals can be partici-
pants in one and nonparticipants in another month. To ensure that all per-
sons we consider are eligible for participation, we require that they re-
ceived UB/UA in the month before (potential) program start. 
To ensure that we do not use unemployed who completed a program 
shortly before (potential) program start (are still in an earlier unemploy-
ment-participation- unemployment spell), we require that nobody partici-
pated in a program in the four years before the (potential) program start 
we consider. For nonparticipants, we require in addition that they did not 
participate in the 11 months following potential program start to ensure 
that they are not too similar to participants with respect to program par-
ticipation while keeping potential selection bias small.  
To obtain a sufficient number of participants we pool participants and non-
participants over a six-month window in the estimation. Thus, we estimate 
effects for 115 program starts in the period 1986-1995. These conditions 
are all subjected to a sensitivity analysis (see Section 7 for details). 
A.3 Measurement of the outcomes 
We measure all outcomes relative to the (potential) program start. When-
ever a person participates in a program, he is considered as registered 
unemployed (and not employed). 
To capture the short-, medium- and long-run effects of training, we meas-
ure all outcome variables at four points in (process) time: 6, 36, 72, and 
96 months after program start. However, as choosing one particular 
month may be a noisy measurement of these effects we calculate the 
short-run outcome as the mean of months 5-7, the medium-run outcome 
as the mean of months 33-39, the long-run outcome after six years as the 
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mean of months 61-72 and the long-run outcome after eight years as the 
mean of months 85-96. 
In this study, we focus on the outcome variables registered unemploy-
ment (defined as receipt of UB or UA or participation in training) and em-
ployment subject to social insurance. We also consider gross earnings as a 
crude measure for individual productivity. 
A.4 Sample sizes of participants 
Figure A.1: Number of participants over time 
p p
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Time varying composition of participants and programmes
Composition of participants held constant
Composition of participants and programmes held constant  
Note: From January 1993 on the number of participants in the specification where the composition 
of both participants and programs is held constant is the same as in the specification where 
only the composition of participants is held constant (because the latter deselects partici-
pants in job search assistance that seizes to exist after 1992). 
 
Sample sizes decrease when keeping first the characteristics of partici-
pants and then the composition of programs constant over time due to 
enforcing common support with our reference population (see A.5 for de-
tails). They never fall below 200 participants pooled over 6 months. The 
average is about 400 participants. While these numbers are sufficient for 
many interesting analyses, it is clear that insights from further disaggre-
gation of the data are clearly limited. 
A.5 Characteristics of the reference population  
The following table provides descriptive statistics for selected characteris-
tics of the reference population we use to keep the composition of partici-
pants and programs constant over time. As reference population, we 
chose the pool of all training participants in our sample in the period 
1986-1995, reduced to the intersection of the common support in all 
starting months. 
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Table A.2 Descriptive statistics for the reference population 
 All participants Common support 
 Mean Std. deviation Mean Std. deviation 
Age in years  34 9.1 33 8.6 
Woman 39 0.49 39 0.49 
Married 39 0.49 34 0.48 
At least one child 33 0.47 26 0.44 
Foreigner 9 0.28 3 0.16 
No professional degree 21 0.40 18 0.38 
Completed apprenticeship training 74 0.44 77 0.42 
University/college degree 6 0.23 6 0.23 
Blue-collar worker 39 0.49 38 0.48 
High-skilled 20 0.40 15 0.36 
Duration of last unemployment spell 11 0.14 7 0.06 
Duration of last employment 36 0.41 33 0.30 
Fraction employed in last 6 years 54 0.29 60 0.28 
Fraction unemployed in last 6 years 26 0.24 19 0.19 
Gross earnings of last employment   ≤ 1000 € 57 0.50 60 0.49 
1000-1500 € 29 0.45 32 0.46 
1500-2000 € 6 0.23 6 0.23 
> 2000 € 2 0.15 3 0.17 
Practice firms 14 0.34 13 0.33 
Short training 36 0.48 36 0.48 
Long training 25 0.43 25 0.43 
Retraining 17 0.37 18 0.39 
Job search assistance 9 0.28 7 0.26 
Planned program duration in months 8.5 7.3 8.9 7.5 
Number of observations 9418 2101 
Note: All variables are measured at or relative to program start. If not stated otherwise the means 
are percentages. Only the common support is used in the estimation. 
 
Appendix B: Technical details of the matching es-
timator used  
We use a matching procedure that incorporates the improvements sug-
gested by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2005). These improvements aim 
at two issues: (i) To allow for higher precision when many 'good' compari-
son observations are available, they incorporate the idea of calliper or ra-
dius matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the standard algo-
rithm. (ii) Furthermore, matching quality is increased by exploiting the 
fact that appropriate weighted regressions that use the sampling weights 
from matching have the so-called double robustness property. This prop-
erty implies that the estimator remains consistent if either the matching 
step is based on a correctly specified selection model, or the regression 
model is correctly specified (e.g. Rubin, 1979; Joffe, Ten, Have, Feldman, 
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and Kimmel, 2004). Moreover, this procedure should reduce small sample 
bias as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators (see Abadie and 
Imbens, 2006) and thus increase robustness of the estimator. 
The actual matching protocol is shown in Table B.1. Lechner, Miquel, and 
Wunsch (2005) contains more technical information about the prototypical 
estimator. 
To keep the characteristics of participants and nonparticipants constant 
over time, we separately match both groups to a reference population to 
obtain estimates of the potential outcomes of both participation and non-
participation for a population that resembles the chosen reference popula-
tion. The average treatment effect on the treated is then obtained by sub-
tracting these estimated potential outcomes. 
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Table B.1: A matching protocol for the estimation of a counterfactual outcome 
and the effects 
Step 1 Specify a reference distribution defined by X.  
Step 2 Pool the observations forming the reference distribution and the participants in the respective period. 
Code an indicator variable W, which is 1 if the observation belongs to the reference distribution. All 
indices, 0 or 1, used below relate to the actual or potential values of W. 
Step 3 Specify and estimate a binary probit for ( ) : ( 1| )p x P W X x= = =  
Step 4 Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the smallest 
maximum and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by W.  
Step 4 Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables. 
 
Standard propensity score matching step (multiple treatments) 
a-1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by W=1 and delete it from that pool. 
b-1) Find an observation in the subsample defined by W=0 that is as close as possible to the one cho-
sen in step a-1) in terms of ( ),p x x% . 'Closeness' is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove 
that observation, so that it can be used again.  
c-1) Repeat a-1) and b-1) until no observation with W=0 is left. 
 
Exploit thick support of X to increase efficiency (radius matching step) 
d-1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between member of reference 
distribution and matched comparison observations. 
a-2) Repeat a-1). 
b-2) Repeat b-1). If possible, find other observations in the subsample of W=0 that are at least as close 
as R * d to the one chosen in step a-2) (to gain efficiency). Do not remove these observations, so that 
they can be used again. Compute weights for all chosen comparisons observations that are propor-
tional to their distance. Normalise the weights such that they add to one. 
c-2) Repeat a-2) and b-2) until no participant in W=1 is left. 
d-2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in a-2) and b-2). 
 
Exploit double robustness properties to adjust small mismatches by regression 
e) Using the weights ( )iw x  obtained in d-2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable 
on the variables used to define the distance (and an intercept).  
f-1) Predict the potential outcome 
0 ( )iy x  of every observation using the coefficients of this regression: 
0ˆ ( )iy x .  
f-2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for  
0( | 1)E Y W =  as: 
00
11
1 1
1
ˆˆ 1( 0) ( )1( 1) ( )N i
i
W w y xW y x
N N=
== −∑
. 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome 
variables in W=0. Subtract the bias from this estimate to get 
 0( | 1)E Y W = . 
Step 5 Repeat Steps 2 to 4 with the nonparticipants playing the role of participants before. This gives the de-
sired estimate of the counterfactual nonparticipation outcome. 
Step 6 The difference of the potential outcomes gives is the desired estimate of the effect with respect to the 
reference distribution specified in Step 1. 
Note: We use the fixed-weight heteroscedasticity robust standard errors suggested by Lechner, 
Miquel, and Wunsch (2005). Since participants and nonparticipants are independent, vari-
ance of the effect is the sum of the variances of the potential outcomes. x%  includes gender, 
elapsed unemployment duration until program start, and whether a person is employed in 
month 12 or month 24 before program start. In some specifications, we also match on edu-
cation. In the specification where program composition is held constant, we also match on 
the type of program and planned program duration. x%  is included to ensure a high match 
quality with respect to these critical variables. R is fixed to 90% in this application (different 
values are checked in the sensitivity analysis). 
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